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1.  INTRODUCTION
Although Korea’s financial crisis of 1997-98 was triggered by foreign currency
shortages in financial institutions, there is little doubt that financial troubles  in the
corporate sector, particularly the chaebols (large family-owned conglomerates), w ere
at the epicenter of the crisis (Lee, Lee and Lee 2000).  A string of corporate
bankruptcies occurred in early 1997, starting with the Hanbo steel company, and these
bankruptcies were directly translated into an  unbearable burden of non-performing
loans (NPLs) and deterioration  in capital adequacy in the financial sector.  These
developments in the corporate and financial sectors undermined international
confidence in the Korean economy, resulting in massive and sudden  outflows of
foreign capital.
Many have argued that the weak financial structure of the corporate sector was
the core source of its financial vulnerability (Kim and Ryu 1998, Nam et. al 1999, Lee
and Lee 1999).  Indeed,  a  high debt-equity ratio had  been a common feature of
Korea’s corporate sector and had been rising for several years before the crisis. In fact,
in 1995 the average debt-equity ratio of the 30 largest  chaebols  was  already 348
percent and then increased further to 519 percent on the eve of the 1997 crisis.  This
was about 6 times as large as the debt-equity ratio in Taiwan.  Moreover, the debt-
equity ratio of those  chaebols  that later became bankrupt and/or subject to  formal
insolvency procedures was at an unsustainable level at the time of the crisis.  Among
these chaebols, the Halla and Jinro groups had “impaired capital” and the New Core
and Haitai groups had debt-equity ratios of  1,784 percent  and 1,501 percent,
respectively!2
A high debt-equity ratio in itself does not, however, cause a firm’s bankruptcy
as long as the firm is generating enough earnings to make interest payments.  It is
when it fails to so that it becomes vulnerable to bankruptcy.  Obviously, the more
leveraged a firm is the more vulnerable it will be to bankruptcy, but what determines
whether the firm will actually go bankrupt or not is the flow of earnings and thus the
ability of the firm to make interest payments.
We will show below that since the late 1980s profit performance of Korea’s
corporate sector had been on a decreasing trend, albeit short-term ups and downs.
What the evidence presented here points to is that Korea’s corporate and financial
sectors had been becoming increasingly vulnerable to crisis for some years before
1997 and the actual timing of the crisis was triggered by the financial crisis in
Thailand in July 1997 and its contagion effect.
The rest of paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 ocuments the buildup of
financial vulnerability in Korea’s corporate sector before the crisis.  Specifically, we
identify the degree to which the corporate sector became exposed to solvency risk
before  the crisis.  To this end, we estimate  the  profitability, leverage, and debt
servicing capacity  of the corporate sector  over the 1986-97 period,  using  a
comprehensive firm-level data-set obtained from the National Information and Credit
Evaluation, Inc. (Korea).  We also estimate the magnitude of latent NPLs held by
financial institutions prior to the crisis.
In section 3 we present a detailed description of corporate profit performance
at an industry-group level  before  the crisis and investigate the underlying factors3
behind the declining profitability.  We  argue that labor costs that began to rise
dramatically starting in the mid-1980s were a key factor behind the loss of
international competitiveness of the corporate  sector, especially the labor-intensive
industries. We also argue that the emergence of foreign competitors such as China
reduced the international competitiveness of Korean firms, particularly those
belonging to the low technology and the medium-low technology industries.  Finally,
section 4 oncludes the paper.
2.  FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE IN KOREA’S CORPORATE SECTOR
To shed light on what the corporate-sector financial landscape was like in the
years preceding the crisis of 1997-98 we examine the financial data of a sample of
6,116 non-financial firms that are subject to external auditing requirements. The firms,
which accounted for 53 percent of total corporate borrowings in 1997, are classified
into three  categories—affiliates  of the top 5  chaebols, affiliates of the top 6-70
chaebols, and non-chaebol independent companies. The sample period is from 1986
to 1997.   
To assess the financial health of  the sample  firms we first use  the interest
payment coverage ratio (IPCR)—the  ratio of  operating earnings over interest
expenses, where operating earnings are the earnings before interest payment and taxes
plus depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).  The advantage of  using  EBITDA is
that it is not affected by the liability structure of the  firm, as it excludes interest
payments, financial income, and other income or expenses.  The definition of IPCR4
implies that the firms with IPCR less than one are at the risk of going bankrupt at any
time and pose serious credit risks to their creditors.
Figure 1 shows the  time profile of IPCR  for the chaebols and non-chaebol
firms over the sample period.  The ratio in the figure is weighted average across firms
in each category.  One notable feature in Figure 1 is that IPCR for all three categories
was on a decreasing trend for almost a decade prior to the crisis despite short-term ups
and downs.  One exception is a temporary upward blip in IPCR for the top 5 chaebols
in 1994-95, which was largely due to an unprecedented boom in the semiconductor
market.  In fact, this  upward blip disappears when  three semiconductor companies
affiliated with  chaebols  (Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics,  and  LG
Semiconductor) are taken out of  the sample.  Another important observation  to be
made is that IPCR for the chaebols excluding the three semiconductor companies was
lower than that for non-chaebol firms, and the top 6-70 chaebols were most vulnerable
to bankruptcy.
-- <Figure 1> Interest Payment Coverage Ratio --
The  declining IPCR or the  weakening debt servicing capacity  of  Korea’s
corporate sector was due to both deteriorating business performance and a rising debt
leverage.  Specifically, since the late 1980s business performance of firms in all three
categories, measured as the ratio of EBITDA over total assets, has deteriorated (except
for the three semiconductor companies affiliated with the top 5 chaebols in 1994-95)
(Figures 2).   Business performance  of the  chaebols ( again  except for  the  three
semiconductor companies) was generally worse than that of  the independent5
companies.
 The debt leverage measured as the ratio of total borrowings to total assets rose
for all firms and the ratio for the chaebols was systemically higher than that for non-
chaebol firms over the entire sample period (Figure 3).
-- <Figure 2> EBITDA/Total Assets --
-- <Figure 3> Total Borrowings to Total Assets --
Table 1 provides more detailed information on the financial  difficulty  that
Korea’s corporate sector was having before the crisis by dividing firms into two
groups: those with IPCR greater than or equal to one and those with IPCR less than
one. As the firms with IPCR of less than one are vulnerable to bankruptcy and are not
likely to pay back the loans, we regard their borrowings as latent NPLs.
-- <Table 1> Latent NPLs in 1994-97 --
It can be seen that well before the crisis of 1997-98 there were already clear
signs of financial trouble in both corporate and financial sectors.  In 1994, the amount
of borrowings by firms with IPCR of less than one was 29 trillion won, accounting for
19 percent of total borrowings by all the sample firms.  Also, the number of such firms
exceeded 1,000 or 20 percent of the total in the sample.  In 1995, the amount of latent
NPLs increased to 32 trillion won even though the economy was in a boom.
1  In 1997,
                                                                
1 According to the official data, the NPL ratio (the ratio of the sum of estimated losses, doubtful, and6
the year of the crisis, latent NPLs jumped to 85 trillion—2.9 times as large as in 1994.
The situation was particularly serious for the top 6 -70  chaebols.  Interestingly,
throughout the 1990s this financial vulnerability in both corporate and financial
sectors did not show up at the macro level, as Korea was then experiencing rapid
output growth fueled by large investment.  It is clear in hindsight  that in the years
preceding the crisis there existed a substantial “false demand” for credits, as happened
in Chile before its crisis in the early 1980s (Harberger 1985), and financial institutions
simply rolled over what were essentially bad loans that had fueled an investment
boom.
3. WHY THE DECLINING PROFITABILITY IN KOREA’S CORPORATE
SECTOR?
So, what accounts for the declining profitability in Korea’s corporate sector?
We might argue that the chaebols’ poor performance in terms of profitability vis-à-vis
independent firms was due to their poor corporate governance. But, as the evidence
presented above demonstrates, it was Korea’s entire corporate sector that  suffered
declining profitability from the late 1980s on, not just the chaebols.   
We argue that the declining profitability of  Korea’s corporate sector  was  a
symptom of  its  weak and deteriorating competitive position in  the world  markets.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
substandard loans to total loans) was low but had been decreasing until 1996 (5.8 percent in 1994, 5.2
percent in 1995, 4.1 percent in 1996).  Hence, if the official data were to be believed there would not
have been a substantial deterioration in bank balance sheets prior to the crisis (Hahm and Mishkin
1999)7
More specifically, we argue that rising labor costs combined with the emergence of
low-cost exporters such as China have  weakened Korea’s international
competitiveness in labor-intensive or low technology industries.  Korea, however, has
not been able to compensate this loss in international competitiveness with a
sufficiently rapid gain in competitiveness in more technology-intensive sectors due to
its weakness in innovating and adopting advanced technologies.  In other words, while
suffering a decline in profitability in labor-intensive, low technology industries,
Korea’s corporate sector has not been able to realize robust or increasing profitability
in more-technology-intensive industries.
To  demonstrate  this  point we  classify the sample firms into four groups,
measuring profit performance for each group separately. The four groups are  low
technology, medium-low technology, medium-high technology, and high technology
industries based on the OECD International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).
2
Figure 4 shows the trend in profitability, measured as the ratio of EBITDA to
total assets, for each industry group for the 1985-1997 period.  Both low technology
and medium-low technology industries experienced a decreasing trend in profitability,
their profitability rate dropping from around 10 percent in 1987 to 5-6 percent  in
1997.  In the medium-high technology industries there were also signs of deterioration
                                                                
2 Low-technology industries are food and beverage, textile, apparel, leather, footwear, chemical textile,
timber, wood products, paper products, and printing. Medium-low technology industries are petroleum
refineries and coal products, rubber products, plastic products, non-metallic mineral products, iron and
steel, non-ferrous metals, metal products, shipbuilding and repairing, and furniture and other
manufacturing.  Medium-high technology industries are industrial chemicals, other chemicals, non-
electric machinery, electrical machinery, railroad equipment, motor vehicles, other transport equipment,
medical and precision equipment, photographic and optical instrument, and watch. High-technology
industries are office and computing equipment, electronics, communication and broadcasting
equipment, and broadcast receiver/video and sound recording equipment, and aircraft.8
in profitability  but to a lesser degree in comparison with low and medium-low
technology industries.  In contrast,  the profit performance  of  the high-technology
industries,  which  shot up markedly  in 1994-95 but fell sharply  in 1996-97, was
considerably stronger than that of other three industry groups.
Figure 5 shows the trend in the share of troubled firms with IPCR of less than
one (i.e., those firms with  interest expenses exceeding operating profits).  It is clear
that starting in the late 1980s the proportion of such troubled firms particularly in the
low and medium-low technology industries increased rapidly despite short-term ups
and downs.  By 1996, over 34 percent and 27 percent of the firms in the  low and
medium-low technology industries, respectively, were in  a vulnerable position.  In
contrast, IPCR in the medium-high and high technology industries remained relatively
stable when compared with that in the low and medium-low technology industries.
The second panel in Figure 5 indicates the amount of borrowings by firms with
IPCR less than one as a share of total borrowings in each industry group. It shows a
sharp increase in this share since the late 1980s with the  exception  of the high-
technology industries.  In  the latter group the share  remained stable and  was  the
lowest among the four.
-- <Figure 4> EBITDA/Total Assets by Industry Group --
-- <Figure 5> Share of Troubled Firms by Industry Group --
The sharp decline in corporate profitability  in 1996-97 may be attributed to
adverse cyclical factors, but structural or competitiveness problems across industries9
may underlie the slowdown since the late 1980s.  One explanation, perhaps the most
important one, for the competitiveness problem facing  the  Korean manufacturing
sector during the period was the labor costs rising in excess of productivity advances
with a consequent increase in the unit labor cost (ULC). Although ULC cannot be
calculated for individual industries owing to the lack of data on value added, the trend
of ULC in the light manufacturing and heavy and chemical industries that we report
here provides some crude evidence of the deteriorating industrial competitiveness and
profit performance (Table 2).
-- <Table 2> Trend of Wage, Productivity and ULC in the Korean Manufacturing --
Between 1986 and 1996, labor productivity in the manufacturing sector
measured as value added per worker increased at an annual rate of 7.3 percent while
wages went up by 15.1 percent per year.  As a consequence, ULC increased by 7.5
percent per year. What is noteworthy is that between 1986 and 1996 labor productivity
in heavy and chemical industries increased by 10.2 percent per year while that in light
manufacturing increased by 5.4 percent  per  year.  In contrast, the rate of wage
increase was quite similar for the two sectors at around 15 percent.  As a result, the
increase in ULC in light manufacturing was twice as high  (8.9 percent) as in heavy
and chemical industries (4.5 percent).  This explains in part why  light manufacturing
industries, which are all labor-intensive, suffered a marked decline  in profitability
since the late 1980s.   
If Korean firms in light manufacturing industries had passed on the high labor
costs as higher prices in the world markets their profitability would not have suffered.10
As price-takers in the global markets, however, these firms would not have been able
to do so. What made the situation worse for the Korean firms was China’s rapid entry
into the world markets where their exports directly competed with those from China.
Indeed, in the early 1980s China started to gain a comparative advantage in labor-
intensive manufactured goods and achieved a rapid export expansion in those products
(Abe and Lee 2001, Zhang 2001).
The weakening  of Korea’s international competitiveness in low technology
industries  when  China was gaining  international  competitiveness  in the same
industries can be seen in  the fall of Korea’s export share in  two of its major export
markets—the United States and Japan.  As can be seen in Figure 6, China increased its
export share in the United States from 1.2 percent in 1985 to 7.3 percent in 1997,
while Korea lost its share from 4.6 percent in 1988 to 2.6 percent in 1997.  Figure 7
shows that China also rapidly entered the Japanese markets with its export share rising
from 5.1 percent in 1985 to 12.4 percent in 1997 while Korea’s share declined from
6.3 percent in 1988 to 4.3 percent in 1997.
Despite the rapid fall of Korea’s export share in the United States and Japan,
Korea was able to increase its export share in the total world markets for almost a
decade prior to the crisis by expanding its exports in the developing countries (Figures
8 and 9). But the fact that the Korean manufacturing sector suffered a secular decline
in profitability during that period suggests that the gain in  the world market share is
due to the slashing of prices at the expense of profit margins and not due to improved
productivity.11
-- <Figure 6> Export Share in the United States  --
-- <Figure 7> Export Share in Japan --
-- <Figure 8> Export Share in World Markets --
--<Figure 9> Korea’s Export Destination—
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are a number of reasons for Korea’s financial crisis of 1997-98 such as its weak
financial system and moral hazard introduced by years of government intervention in
credit allocation.  In this paper we have argued that there were structural causes, both
internal and external, for the crisis.  Starting in the late 1980s the Korean corporate
sector suffered declining profitability due to rising labor costs and increasing
competition in the world markets for labor-intensive, low technology manufactured
products. In other words, for both internal and external reasons Korea was losing its
comparative advantage in those industries.
Korea, however, has not been able to gain a comparative advantage in more
technology-intensive industries rapidly enough to offset this loss, thus resulting in
declining profitability generally throughout the entire manufacturing sector.  In other
words, Korea has not yet made the full transition from an economy specializing by
and large in labor-intensive, low technology industries to an economy able to compete12
globally in industries with more advanced technologies. The crisis of 1997-98 is a
symptom of the failure to make that transition when the country was faced with
rapidly rising labor costs and growing competition from labor-abundant economies
such as China.
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